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COGNITIVE REFLECTION IN MULTI-ISSUE 
NEGOTIATION 
 




Suboptimal outcomes in negotiation have been associated with the implicit fixed-pie bias. 
The ability to correct this bias might be a critical capacity in negotiation and is often at the 
core of negotiation training. Cognitive reflection – an individual thinking disposition 
enabling people to suppress and override automatic responses – predicts performance in a 
variety of individual heuristics and biases tasks. A study (N = 262) investigated whether 
cognitive reflection predicts negotiation outcomes and whether improvements associated 
with training are mediated by training-enhanced cognitive reflection of the participants. The 
results show that cognitive reflection predicts both an individual negotiator’s gain and all 
aspects of joint gain. Training enhances performance and is partially mediated by increased 
cognitive reflection. The findings support the proposition that cognitive reflection is an 
independent thinking disposition that underpins resistance to bias and improves outcomes in 
negotiation settings. 
 





* Lecturer, Director of Professional Skills, King’s College London, mihael.jeklic@kcl.ac.uk. 
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Unreasonable haste is the direct road to error. 
Molière 
We are not particularly good in making the most out of negotiation. In situations that allow 
creating value beyond what is immediately obvious, negotiators systematically and 
predictably fail to optimize by agreeing to lose-lose features (Thompson & Hrebec, 1996), 
leaving value on the table and reaching impasse (Raiffa, 1982; Thompson, 2005). The quality 
of outcomes has been considered a function of negotiators’ social motivation and resistance 
to yielding (Druckman, 1994; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986), their social and epistemic motivation 
(De Dreu, Beersma, Stroebe, & Euwema, 2006; De Dreu, Koole, & Steinel, 2000; Van Kleef, 
De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004), their mental models or orientations (Bazerman, Curhan, 
Moore, & Valley, 2000; Menkel-Meadow, 1983; Van Boven & Thompson, 2003) and their 
mixed motives (Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Mnookin, 2000; Murnighan, Babcock, Thompson, 
& Pillutla, 1999).  
However, the dominant approach to understanding outcome suboptimality has been the 
behavioral decision perspective (Bazerman & Neale, 1991, 1992; Neale & Bazerman, 1992) 
that views the negotiators’ inability to maximize outcomes as the result of biased decision-
making. The key cognitive failure is the fixed-pie bias: negotiators tend to assume their 
interests are in direct conflict with the interests of the other side, leading to competitive 
behaviors and unexplored value (Bazerman & Neale, 1992; Pinkley, Griffith, & Northcraft, 
1995; Thompson, 1991; Thompson & Hastie, 1990; Thompson & Hrebec, 1996). Effective 
training in negotiation more or less explicitly addresses this critical bias by urging 
negotiators to look beyond the salient features and generate value (Nadler & Thompson, 
2003; Patton, 2009; Van Boven & Thompson, 2003). 
Forty years of a separate ‘heuristics and biases’ line of research documented systematic 
violations of rationality in a wide array of individual thinking tasks (e.g., incorrect 
probability assessments, faulty hypothesis testing, context dependency, framing; Kahneman, 
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2011). This research also identified a thinking disposition (‘cognitive reflection’; Frederick, 
2005) – enabling people to override automatic (biased) intuitions with deliberative thinking 
– that provides a measure of protection against bias. However, the research on cognitive 
reflection has been limited to individual decision-making tasks rather than tasks involving 
strategic interdependence. The present study extends this research to negotiation.  
To the extent the fixed-pie bias is the key barrier to efficiency in negotiation, cognitive 
reflection might be a critical capacity for negotiators. We investigate, first, whether cognitive 
reflection predicts individual and joint negotiation outcomes, and second, whether the 
positive effects of negotiation training are mediated by training-enhanced cognitive 
reflection of the participants. 
Cognitive reflection in independent thinking tasks 
Contemporary dual-process theories (for an overview see Stanovich, 2011) see decision-
making in terms of a power-expense tradeoff between automatic and controlled cognition, 
where the default outputs of the former system can be intervened on by the latter (Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011; Stanovich, 2011). The heuristic-based automatic 
cognition rapidly and effortlessly processes a large amount of information and its first-
approximations tend to be sufficiently accurate most of the time, particularly in ‘benign’ 
environments (Kahneman & Klein, 2009). However, they tend to be predictably and 
systematically off-mark in complex tasks (Kahneman, 2011) and need to be overridden by 
serial controlled computation. Because controlled processes involve high computational 
cost, people experience them as aversive and tend to default to automatic processes (the 
'cognitive miser' phenomenon; Frederick, 2005; Kahneman, 2011; Stanovich, 2011; 
Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 2016; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2014).  
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The degree of miserliness in information processing is different among people. The 
Cognitive Reflection Test (the 'CRT'; Frederick, 2005) is the quintessential measure of the 
capacity to detect conflicting responses of automatic and controlled systems. For example, 
its item ‘if a bat and a ball jointly cost $1.10, and the bat costs $1 more than the ball, how 
much is the ball?’ is difficult not because it requires any complicated calculation, but because 
it demands detecting that the automatic answer (10 cents) that ‘springs “impulsively” to 
mind’ (Frederick, 2005, p. 27) needs to be checked and corrected  by controlled thinking (to 
arrive at the correct answer of 5 cents). The CRT predicts performance in a wide array of 
independent thinking tasks better than assessments of cognitive ability, thinking dispositions, 
and executive functioning (Cokely & Kelley, 2009; Oechssler, Roider, & Schmitz, 2009; 
Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011). This research however investigates the impact of 
cognitive reflection on performance in individual thinking tasks (for an overview of thinking 
problems see West, 2011) that do not involve strategic interaction and mixed motives. The 
following section discusses a potential impact of cognitive reflection in mixed-motive 
negotiation. 
Cognitive reflection in (mixed motives) multi-issue negotiation 
While negotiations normally carry the potential to create value beyond what is immediately 
obvious (Deutsch, 1973; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; Walton & McKersie, 1965), negotiators 
assume the contrary. The critical bias identified by the decision perspective research is that 
the value in negotiation is fixed (the ‘fixed-pie’ or ‘zero-sum’ assumption), which leads the 
parties to focus on the competitive distributive aspects of the interaction and leave value 
creation out of focus (see e.g., Bazerman, Magliozzi, & Neale, 1985; Bazerman & Neale, 
1986, 1991; De Dreu et al., 2000; Menkel-Meadow, 1983; Neale & Bazerman, 1992; 
O'Connor & Adams, 1999; Pinkley et al., 1995; Thompson, 1991). A related bias is that 
negotiators’ interests cannot be compatible (i.e., if I want something, the counterparty will 
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oppose that) and causes lose-lose agreements where the parties both prefer one option, but 
settle for another (Thompson & Hrebec, 1996).  
These assumptions are a potent barrier to outcome efficiency because the critical information 
about payoffs is asymmetric. To generate value by trading (i.e., 'logrolling' to capture 
'integrative gain'; Froman & Cohen, 1970) or identifying jointly-preferred options 
('compatible gain'; Thompson & Hrebec, 1996) negotiators need to focus on and utilize the 
correct aspects of not only their own, but also their counterparties’ payoffs, which they do 
not know. The information exchange is fraught with risk and often obfuscated by competitive 
tactics (Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Mnookin, 2000; Murnighan et al., 1999), and the imparted 
information is difficult to verify (Bond, 2008; Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Depaulo et al., 2003; 
Hartwig & Bond, 2014; Sporer & Schwandt, 2007). The fixed-pie bias in such ambiguous 
and uncertain ('fuzzy'; De Dreu, Beersma, Steinel, & Van Kleef, 2007) situations focuses the 
negotiators’ attention and efforts squarely on the competitive distributive tactics, thus 
depressing joint value. These ‘faulty assumptions about the counterparty and the negotiation 
situation’ are seen as the key culprit for suboptimal outcomes in negotiation (e.g., Thompson, 
2005, p. 95).  
The proposition we test in this paper is that the fixed-pie bias (and its close cousin the 
incompatibility bias) is the automatic but erroneous intuitive response given by automatic 
processes to the more or less explicit question about the counterparty’s preferences, which 
leads to erroneous perceptions about value potential in negotiation and competitive 
interaction. These outputs can be, but are often not, detected and corrected by the negotiators’ 
controlled cognitive effort. 
The first part of this study tests whether the metacognitive capacity to detect a potential 
conflict between the automatic response (the fixed-pie bias) and controlled cognition 
predicts (i) individual gain and (ii) the two components of dyadic gain that require 
negotiators to exploit the differences in payoffs (that is, integrative and compatible gain). In 
the second part, we investigate the role cognitive reflection has in negotiation training. To 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3744082




the best of our knowledge, no study has so far tested the impact of cognitive reflection on 
negotiation outcomes. 
Cognitive reflection and negotiation training  
Training improves negotiation performance (Lewicki, 2014; Movius, 2008; Patton, 2009; 
Thompson, 1991). The effects seem to last (Coleman & Joanne Lim, 2001; Soliman, Stimec, 
& Antheaume, 2014) and correlate with the intensity of the training (ElShenawy, 2010; 
Thompson, 1991). Observational and analogical learning are more effective than didactic 
learning or learning by information revelation (Nadler & Thompson, 2003), and experience-
based negotiation training outperforms instruction-based training (Van Boven & Thompson, 
2003).  
Because the fixed-pie assumption is the critical barrier to efficiency, training needs to correct 
this bias. Even the most basic education in interest-based negotiation is effectively a call to 
engage explicit cognition and look beyond the salient features of the negotiation: ‘focus on 
interests, not positions’ (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991); in the classic anecdote, two quarreling 
men in the library can achieve a win-win outcome only by moving beyond the initial zero-
sum frame (p. 40; originally in Follet, 1925). Prescriptive advice for creating value – e.g., to 
systematically prepare; to take the counterparty’s perspective and identify value-creating 
options (e.g., Patton, 2005); to dovetail differences; to add issues to negotiation; and to make 
simultaneous offers (e.g., Lax & Sebenius, 2006) – is more or less explicitly aimed at 
revising the assumption that the value is fixed.  
Even when not focused specifically on changing mindsets (c.f., Ade, Schuster, Harinck, & 
Trötschel, 2018), training changes how negotiators understand the negotiation game. Van 
Boven and Thompson (2003) found that the mental models of beginner negotiators who 
managed to reach optimal agreements reflected greater understanding of the payoff structure, 
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and the processes of trading and information exchange, than their peers who failed to 
optimize. In addition, the mental models of negotiators who received training were similar 
to the models of beginner negotiators who reached optimal settlements, except that they were 
more abstract.  
In this study, we (i) control for training when testing the impact of cognitive reflection on 
outcomes, and (ii) test whether cognitive reflection mediates the relationship between 
training and outcomes.  
Present study 
A trained and untrained group of participants performed a multi-issue negotiation task and 
were assessed on cognitive reflection. We expected that (i) training would increase all 
aspects of joint gain, (ii) cognitive reflection would predict dyadic and individual gain in 
negotiation, and (iii) cognitive reflection would mediate the impact of training on dyadic 
outcomes. 
Method 
Participants and procedure 
The participants (N = 262) were law students at a large university in the United Kingdom. 
The untrained group (n = 172, 64% female, age 21 - 37) was recruited from the graduate 
population during the first week of their masters’ course. The trained group (n = 90) was 
recruited from graduate (n = 42, 64% female) and undergraduate students (n = 48, 67% 
female) that participated in our negotiation courses.i  
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The participants were randomly paired up within their group, prepared the case for up to 20 
minutes and negotiated for 30, after which they filled out the contract form and the CRT. 
They received no compensation for their involvement. The university ethics board granted 
the approval for the study.  
Post hoc power analysis with G*power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) showed 
that this study’s sample size had >99% power to detect the effects of a multiple linear 
regression with three predictors at alpha p = .05.  
Training 
Prior to the study, the trained group engaged in a number of negotiation simulations and 
received a mix of didactic- and discussion-based lessons in the game-theoretic cooperation-
competition model of negotiation (Lax & Sebenius, 1986), principled (interest-based) 
negotiation (Fisher et al., 1991), competitive tactics for distributive negotiation (Lax & 
Sebenius, 2006), and the three-tensions model (Mnookin, 2000). The participants have 
received no specific training in logrolling techniques and have completed no multi-issue 
scorable tasks prior to the experiment. 
Negotiation task 
The task was a multiple-issue employment negotiation common in negotiation research (e.g., 
Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, & White, 2008; Maddux, Mullen, & Galinsky, 2008; Thompson, 
1991; Thompson & Hastie, 1990). To reach an agreement, the parties must agree eight issues, 
each with five possible options worth different numbers of points (Table 1). Two issues are 
distributive (zero-sum), two are compatible (the parties’ payoffs are identical) and the 
remaining four are integrative (the payoffs are relatively different and allow logrolling). The 
instructions state that the payoff schedules must not be shown to the counterparty. 
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Predictors and outcome variables 
Outcome variables were negotiators’ individual gain, and dyadic joint, integrative and 
compatible gains. Predictors were a binary variable indicating whether the participant 
received training, and individual and dyadic (summed) scores from the CRT (Frederick, 
2005). We used the CRT because extensive research demonstrates it is a unique predictor of 
performance in a wide array of decision-making tasks, superior to assessments of cognitive 
ability, thinking dispositions, and executive functioning (Campitelli & Gerrans, 2014; 
Campitelli & Labollita, 2010; Cokely & Kelley, 2009; Liberali, Reyna, Furlan, Stein, & 
Pardo, 2012; Oechssler et al., 2009; Toplak et al., 2011). We found CRT particularly 
appropriate for this study because it measures the ability to suspend and override an 
immediate and attractive (and erroneous) solutions generated by each item (e.g., 10 cents in 
Table 1. Payoff matrix of the negotiation task  
Bonus Recruiter Candidate  Job Assignment Recruiter Candidate 
10% 0 4000  Division A 0 0 
8% 400 3000  Division B -600 -600 
6% 800 2000  Division C -1200 -1200 
4% 1200 1000  Division D -1800 -1800 
2% 1600 0  Division E -2400 -2400 
Vacation Time Recruiter Candidate  Starting Date Recruiter Candidate 
25 days 0 1600  01 Jun 0 2400 
20 days 1000 1200  15 Jun 600 1800 
15 days 2000 800  01 Jul 1200 1200 
10 days 3000 400  15 Jul 1800 600 
5 days 4000 0  01 Aug 2400 0 
Moving Expenses Recruiter Candidate  Insurance Recruiter Candidate 
100% 0 3200  Plan A 0 800 
90% 200 2400  Plan B 800 600 
80% 400 1600  Plan C 1600 400 
70% 600 800  Plan D 2400 200 
60% 800 0  Plan E 3200 0 
Salary Recruiter Candidate  Location Recruiter Candidate 
$90,000 -6000 0  New York 0 0 
$88,000 -4500 -1500  Boston 300 300 
$86,000 -3000 -3000  Chicago 600 600 
$84,000 -1500 -4500  Atlanta 900 900 
$82,000 0 -6000  San Francisco 1200 1200 
Integrative gain is the sum of points negotiators achieve in bonus, vacation, moving expenses, and insurance 
issues (the maximum is 14,400, the split-down-the-middle compromise is 9,600 points). Compatible gain is 
the sum of points in job assignment and location issues (the maximum is 2,400 points, the compromise is -
600 points). Joint gain is the sum of negotiators’ points in integrative and compatible issues, which vary 
depending on dyadic performance, and distributive issues (salary and starting date) that are a constant -3,600 
per dyad (the maximum is 13,200, the compromise is 4,400 points). 
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the ‘Ball and Bat’ item), which mirrors the immediate and attractive fixed-pie assumption in 
negotiation settings. 
Data analysis  
In instances of impasse the dyadic values for joint and integrative gain were replaced with 
the minimum scores in the group. We first tested the impact of training on the outcome 
variables, and followed with the regression of gains on CRT and training. For individual 
gain, we performed hierarchical regression with dyad as random effect. For mediation 
analysis we used Stata’s SEM and PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2020) and estimated 
the confidence intervals by bootstrapping 5000 samples. 
Results 
Training 
Training increased all aspects of dyadic gain; one-way MANOVA showed a significant effect 
on both adjusted compatible and integrative gain; F(2, 128) = 14.25, p < .001, Λ = .82. 
Contrast analysis is in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Contrast analysis of adjusted joint, integrative and compatible gains between 
trained and untrained samples. 
   Joint gain  Integrative gain  Compatible gain 
 N  M SD   M SD   M SD 
Untrained 86  8,560 2,698  10,897 3,165  1,263 1,228 
Trained 45  10,787 1,954  12480 1,729  1,907 934 
t   5.60   5.15   2.97  
p   <.001   <.001   .002  
d   .901   .979   .472  
The test statistic is Welch-adjusted t-test (single-tailed). Results remain significant if adjusted for multiple 
comparisons. 
0 
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Trained negotiators outperformed their untrained peers by 29% in (unadjusted) joint gain, 
resulting from a 21% improvement in (unadjusted) integrative gain and a 33% increase in 
compatible gain (Figure 1).  
 
Cognitive reflection  
Dyadic CRT was predictive of joint gain and its components integrative and compatible gain 
when controlled for training (Table 3).ii There was no interaction between the terms. 
A mixed-effects (hierarchical) regression with individual CRT scores and training as 
predictors and dyad as the random effect was significant; Wald(2) = 36.23, p < .001. Both 
individual CRT scores (β = 313.54, 95% CI [76.42, 550.65], p = .010) and training (β = 
1044.71, 95% CI [637.05, 1452.38], p < .001) were predictive. There was no interaction 
between the terms (p = .67). 
 
Figure 1. Joint gain, integrative gain and compatible gain as percentage of optimal outcome 
in untrained and trained groups (unadjusted) 
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As expected, the relationship between training and joint gain was partially mediated by 
dyadic CRT; F(1, 129) = 24.00, p < .001, R2 = .157 (Figure 2).  
Table 3. Multiple regression models of the impact of Dyadic CRT and training on joint, 
integrative and compatible gain  
Dyadic N = 131      
Joint gain  Coef.  SE t p [95% CI] 
Dyadic CRT 446.726 111.573 4.00 <.001 225.959 667.493 
Training 1792.751 443.459 4.04 <.001 915.29 2670.211 
Constant 7256.649 411.787 17.62 <.001 6441.859 8071.44 
R2  .251      
F   21.415      
p <.001      
 
Integrative gain  Coef.  SE t p [95% CI] 
Dyadic CRT 274.984 73.576 3.74 <.001 129.402 420.567 
Training 1315.512 292.435 4.50 <.001 736.879 1894.146 
Constant 10095.103 271.549 37.18 <.001 9557.797 10632.41 
R2  .261      
F   22.551      
p <.001      
 
Compatible gain  Coef.  SE t p [95% CI] 
Dyadic CRT 477.238 199.611 2.39 .018 82.273 872.204 
Training 171.741 65.274 2.63 .010 42.586 300.896 
Constant 761.546 300.055 2.54 .012 167.835 1355.257 
R2  0.100      
F   6.038      
p  0.003      
 
Note. Variables are adjusted for no-deals. Standard errors in the regression of adjusted compatible gain are 
based on the robust variance estimator. 
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Training predicted the CRT scores; β = .97, 95% CI [.31, 1.63], z = 2.88, p = .004. The 
indirect effect was significant and explained 19.5% of the total effect; β = 433.45, 95% CI 
[117.24, 830.17]. The direct effect of training on outcomes remained significant; β = 
1792.75, 95% CI [915.29, 2670.21], z = 4.09, p < .001.iii 
Discussion 
The results of this study extend cognitive reflection research to situations involving mixed 
motives and strategic interdependence. These novel findings have considerable practical 
importance because of the pervasiveness of negotiation in human affairs, the vast amount of 
value at stake, and our poor record of value optimization, wasted resources, incurred social 
costs and increased conflict (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986).  
Cognitive reflection was a significant predictor of dyadic and individual gain in a multi-issue 
scorable negotiation task. To the extent that the implicit fixed-pie assumption is the major 
barrier to efficient outcomes, suppressing and overriding this assumption is a sine qua non 
for value creation, and the ability to detect that such suppression and override are necessary 
– cognitive reflection – is a key trait of an effective negotiator. To some degree, this insight 
is not surprising. The capacity to take a mental step back and think outside of the zero sum-
Figure 2. Regression coefficients for the relationship between training and joint gain 
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frame to generate value has long been considered a key trait of an effective negotiator (e.g., 
the window in the library example; Fisher et al., 1991; Follet, 1925). Several studies have 
also indicated that the CRT may measure a cognitive trait that includes more characteristics 
than originally suggested by Frederick (2005). Instead of assessing only the relatively narrow 
capacity to detect potentially asynchronous outputs of automatic and controlled systems, the 
CRT may capture the more general disposition to suppress impulsiveness and conduct an 
elaborative domain-specific heuristics search in situations where normative models are 
unavailable (Campitelli & Labollita, 2010; Cokely & Kelley, 2009). Such open-mindedness 
would facilitate adaptive action in unencountered contexts such as novel negotiation tasks.  
The fixed pie bias is a particularly potent barrier to maximizing integrative gain, which is 
where we found the strongest effect of cognitive reflection. To logroll, a negotiator must 
realise there are differences between their own payoffs, which they know, and the 
counterparty’s, which they do not. If the pie is assumed to be fixed, there is no need to pay 
attention to payoffs and explore whether additional value could be created by trading on 
differences. It is worth noting that detecting the need to examine this assumption is essential, 
but only does half of the job: unlike in heuristics and biases tasks, a negotiator cannot work 
out the solution alone, but needs to interact with the counterparty and exchange information, 
which is subject to the information dilemma and verification problems (e.g., Depaulo et al., 
2003; Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Murnighan et al., 1999).  
Identifying compatible issues is a tad more random than optimizing integrative gain. The 
compatible option is the best outcome for both parties (choosing any other option is a 'lose-
lose' agreement; Thompson & Hrebec, 1996). While a reflective detection and override of 
the incompatibility bias will likely lead to optimization, it is not necessary as the parties can 
stumble upon the correct solution by chance when one party one-sidedly discloses their 
general preferences on the issue (Loschelder, Swaab, Trötschel, & Galinsky, 2014). This is 
likely the reason for the weaker effect of cognitive reflection on compatible gain that we 
found in our study. 
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The findings of this study also add to research showing that education improves outcomes 
in negotiation, by demonstrating its impact on the components of joint gain.  Training 
improved mean joint gain by 29%, resulting from a 21% increase in integrative and a 33% 
increase in compatible gain.  
Our prediction that training is effective to the extent that it brings cognitive reflection to the 
fore was only partially supported by the results. While training did increase the CRT scores, 
the mediation was partial: the indirect effect was in the region of 20 percent of total effect of 
training on outcomes. We interpret these results as follows. While suspending the output of 
automatic processes is procedural, it is difficult to separate process and knowledge 
considerations in decision-making tasks; the mindware plays a critical part (Stanovich, 2011; 
Stanovich et al., 2016). A person who has been trained that negotiation situations may appear 
zero-sum but often carry hidden value potential (Van Boven & Thompson, 2003) is more 
likely to detect that their immediate fixed-pie perception needs a controlled cognitive check 
than a person who has not received such training. This would explain the mediation effect. 
At the same time, stimulus discriminations, and decision-making rules and principles that 
have been practiced to automaticity can be part of the implicit cognition (Kahneman & Klein, 
2009). In other words, a trained negotiator’s automatic investigation of interests and an eager 
student’s blind following of the instruction to ‘make multiple offers’ may be uncorrelated 
with their general tendency to resist miserly processing and engage cognitive reflection. 
While such heuristic tricks of the trade are grounded in the recognition of how incorrect the 
fixed-pie bias is, their application does not require cognitive reflection. This raises 
interesting possibilities for future research. For example, can cognitive reflection be trained 
with lasting results? Which components of negotiation training increase it? Would 
negotiators who use cognitive reflection be more effective than the ones using heuristic tricks 
of the trade in novel situations (e.g., settling a legal dispute, negotiating a border, diffusing 
a hostage situation or agreeing a ceasefire in a military conflict)?  
The current research has several limitations. First, although the findings lend general support 
to the proposition that cognitive reflection improves outcomes because it enables higher-
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level cognitive override of the implicit fixed-pie bias, the study correlated outcomes with 
CRT scores rather than with any record of the hypothesized cognitive processes. We did not 
administer questionnaires about implicit processes during the negotiation to avoid providing 
hints to participants that could interfere with the experiment, and have not conducted a post-
negotiation survey because participants’ self-reports of such implicit processes tend to be 
unreliable (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Future studies might consider tackling this challenge 
using qualitative methods to tease out the processes that enable dyads with higher CRT 
scores to capture higher dyadic gains.  
Second, the task we used deviates from real-life bargaining in important ways. This limits 
the generalizability of the findings. However, multi-issue tasks with asymmetric payoffs, 
like the task used in this study, have been an effective research tool in the field. The 
consensus in the research community seems to be that while the magnitude of the observed 
effects may not be directly generalizable, the results themselves are likely to replicate in 
natural settings (De Dreu & Carnevale, 2005).  
Third, the improved results in the trained group may be partly due to an epistemic 
understanding of negotiation as carrying integrative potential that the negotiators shared at 
the dyadic level (i.e. both negotiators knew they attended the same training advocating 
negotiation as commonly containing hidden value). This may have resulted in a tacit value-
claiming ceasefire that allowed negotiators to explore options boosting integrative and 
compatible gain. To the extent such epistemic collusion is a significant factor, the 
demonstrated benefits of training may not fully generalize to situations outside of the joint 
learning environment. At the same time, this also serves as a reminder of the benefits of a 
widespread education in negotiation and conflict resolution. This is an area for further study.  
Fourth, the popularity of the CRT as a research instrument might have the unfortunate effect 
of reducing the test’s validity as its items become widely known (Haigh, 2016; Thomson & 
Oppenheimer, 2016). However, the performance on the CRT seems to be stable over time 
and robust to multiple exposures. Stagnaro, Pennycook, and Rand (2018) identified 3,302 
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unique participants who had completed the CRT two or more times and found a strong 
correlation between their first and last CRT scores (r = .81). Bialek and Pennycook (2018) 
found that multiple exposures do not invalidate the CRT. Finally, Meyer, Zhou, and Shane 
(2018) examined over 14,000 Mechanical Turk participants who took the test up to 25 times 
and found that prior exposure failed to improve scores; participants’ increase in score was a 
mere 0.024, and even that was chiefly driven by the minority who spent time reflecting on 
the questions. Finally, the later scores retain the predictive validity of earlier ones, as the 
initial success and subsequent improvement measure the same ability. 
Overall, this study provides support to the idea that the capacity to resist impulsive intuitions 
and instead engage in effortful deliberation improves performance not only in heuristics and 
biases tasks, but also in negotiation. Taking a step back and thinking carefully increases gain. 
Haste indeed makes waste. 
 
Endnotes 
i  There were no differences in negotiation outcomes and CRT scores between graduate 
and undergraduate groups. Gender also had no impact on the results. This is not discussed 
further. 
ii  Tables showing the impact of cognitive reflection on trained and untrained samples 
separately is in the Supplementary Information. 
iii  The SEM and mediation analysis of the indirect impact of CRT on integrative gain 
and compatible gain are in the Supplementary Information. 
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Cognitive Reflection Test 
 
Source:  Frederick, S. (2005). Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 19(4), 25-42. doi:10.1257/089533005775196732 
 
 A bat and a ball cost £1.10 in total. The bat costs £1.00 more than the ball.  How much does 
the ball cost?  
_____ pennies  
  
If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to 
make 100 widgets?   
_____ minutes  
 
In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days 
for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the 
lake?   
_______ days  
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CRT in trained and untrained samples 
 
 
Simple regressions of dyadic gains on dyadic CRT in trained and untrained groups 
    Untrained sample  Trained sample 











Dyadic CRT     431.13** 231.95** 199.18*     555.97**    430.17**  125.81 
    (149.36) (86.69) (87.27)  (159.06) (147.77)   (95.93) 
Constant 7302.18   10220.71 681.46  8415.13 10689.32 1325.81 
   (517.63) (300.45) (361.28)    (701.19)     (651.41)   (424.12) 
 R2 .090 .079 .059  .259 .195 .052 
* p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001  
Note. Variables are adjusted for no-deals. Standard errors in the regressions of compatible gain are based 
on the robust variance estimator. 
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Structural Equation Model       
        
Integrative gain (adjusted) Coef. SE z p .95 CI 
 Dyadic CRT 274.98 72.73 3.78 .000 132.44 417.53 
 Training 1315.51 289.07 4.55 .000 748.95 1882.07 
  Constant 10095.10 268.42 37.61 .000 9569.01 10621.20 
        
Dyadic CRT Coef. SE z p .95 CI 
 Training 0.97 0.34 2.88 .004 0.31 1.63 
  Constant 2.92 0.20 14.79 .000 2.53 3.31 
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Structural Equation Model       
        
Compatible gain (adjusted) Coef. Robust SE z p .95 CI 
 Dyadic CRT 171.74 64.77 2.65 .008 44.80 298.69 
 Training 477.24 198.07 2.41 .016 89.03 865.45 
  Constant 761.55 297.74 2.56 .011 177.99 1345.10 
        
Dyadic CRT Coef. Robust SE z p .95 CI 
 Training 0.97 0.33 2.93 .003 0.32 1.62 
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